|
Examples
|
Type
of Evaluation / Measures
|
Results
|
Lessons
Learned / Caveats
|
|
| SUBSIDIES
AND INCENTIVES (see
STRATEGIES AND TOOLS) |
|
| Incentives'
role in site location |
Survey of 950 Michigan companies. Companies chosen
randomly from a membership database of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce. |
Among 34 factors affecting location decision, the highest
ranked was the city's general business climate and attitude towards
industry. Financial inducements were ranked fourth. |
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|
| Incentives'
role in site location |
Reviewed regression studies.
|
Location incentives, such as property
tax abatement, make some difference to state and local economic growth.
Also, subsidies may encourage an expansion of national employment. |
Competition among state and local
governments may enhance the efficiency of the U.S. economy. |
|
| Influence
of property tax abatements |
Regression study. |
Tax abatement on manufacturing
property helps recruit or retain business but increasing the number
or magnitude of the abatement will not continue to grow the manufacturing
base. |
Tax abatements have negative secondary
effects including decline in value of local homes, declining government
expenditures per capita, and increase in rate of user charges. |
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|
| Incentives'
role in site location |
Hypothetical firm model. |
Incentives accentuate basic tax
differences. Small differences in labor and other costs outweigh large
differences in taxes and incentives. |
Neither tax incentives nor non-tax incentives offset
the effects of the basic state-local tax systems |
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| Effectiveness
of firm-specific incentives provided by Industrial Development Agencies
(IDAs) in NY |
Case study of IDAs' bonding activities
between 1987 and 1991. |
Total tax losses exceeded $1.3
billion. Little evidence to suggest IDAs encourage firms to relocate,
remain or expand within the state. |
States considering the use of firm-specific tax incentives
to spur economic growth and create jobs should look for other methods. |
|
|
Enterprise
zones (in eight states)
|
Comparison of enterprise zone to
the city in which it is located. |
Tax incentives were offset by higher
costs, including insurance, transportation and access to raw materials.
No significant change in growth rates in zones in comparison to the
city as a whole. |
By itself, a typical enterprise
zone is unable to adequately provide the necessary factors for business
growth. The impact of zone incentives on location was only significant
for small businesses. |
|
| Enterprise
zone programs |
Review of 21 studies covering enterprise zone programs
across the country. |
Found little evidence of program success. |
Lack of effective planning may be an important missing
element in enterprise zone programs. |
|
| Enterprise
zone program in New Jersey |
Case study examining changes in employment and real
estate value. |
No evidence of job growth or increased real estate
values. |
|
|
| Enterprise
zones in Illinois |
Study of 68 enterprise zones |
Large net benefits. |
Caveat: study assumed that all employment generated
in the zones was attributable to program incentives. |
|
| Enterprise
zones in California. Performance of 13 zones between 1986 and 1990. |
Study used a shift-share analysis
of employment changes. |
All employment growth is explained by countywide growth
and industrial mix. There is little evidence that the enterprise zones
strengthened economically sluggish neighborhoods. |
|
|
| Enterprise
zone in Louisville |
Examined forgone tax and employment changes |
Significant costs and modest benefits. Number of jobs
and number of employed zone residents fell, although the rest of the
county experienced growth. |
Unable to precisely determine costs and benefits of
the program. |
|
| Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit |
Comparison of earnings and labor force participation
of program participants and a comparable group. |
Found substantial earnings gains for participants and
gains exceeded program costs. Participants more likely to be employed
and evidence suggested gains are long-term. |
|
|
| BUSINESS
ASSISTANCE (see
STRATEGIES AND TOOLS) |
|
| Business
Incubators; analysis of 50 incubators |
Focus groups of incubator managers, stakeholders and
graduate firms. |
Business incubators are an effective educational tool;
they assist new business survival and growth and create jobs. |
Criticism: Most incubators are not financially self-sustaining.
40 of the 50 incubators analyzed did not break even. |
|
| Business
incubators |
Case study measured job creation, product innovation,
new business starts and local location after graduation. |
Job creation per firm is small (10), but increased
over time. |
Incubators are long-term economic development strategy.
Evaluations should address both short- and long-run impacts. |
|
| Assistance
to small and medium- size manufacturers in New York; the New York
Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) |
Evaluation conducted by a quasi-experimental design
comparing performance of MEP clients with similar companies. |
Participating companies changed important business
and manufacturing processes, improved performance and increased value
added. Over a two-year period, 510-1,920 jobs were created and additional
$30-110 million of value added was created. |
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|
| Assistance
to small and medium-size manufacturers in Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania's
Industrial Resource Centers (IRCs) |
Evaluation based on comparing participating companies
and similar firms. |
IRC clients increased labor productivity and contributed
to an increase in gross state product. IRC added $120 million to state
revenues. IRC return on state investment was 22:1. |
|
|
| Assistance
to small and medium-size companies; Ohio Edison Technology Centers
|
Economic impact analysis of over 1,500 projects undertaken
by seven centers over the 1994-98 period. Measures include client-company
cost savings, employment gains and increased sales. |
Participating firms realized $297 million of cost savings
and increased sales of $709 million due to improvement associated
with the centers. The centers created 4,628 jobs in Ohio and disposable
income increased by $195 million annually. |
Analysis conducted on all centers combined. Centers
are located throughout the state and each assists different industries.
|
|
| State
support of technology pioneering firms |
In-depth case studies of four companies. |
The companies were successful and state programs were
instrumental to their success by subsidizing their use of university
resources and making direct equity investments. |
Financial return on equity investments may provide
important benefits to the state. Focusing on employment gains is a
shortsighted method to measure success. |
|
| Promotion
of technological innovation in Pennsylvania; the Ben Franklin Partnership
(BPF) |
Evaluation based on in-depth case studies; client-reported
impact; and estimates of value added, employment and tax revenues
generated by the program. |
Over a seven-year period, BFP resulted in 21,800 additional
jobs in client firms, with jobs paying salaries 45 percent higher
than the average state salary. Additional 24,500 jobs were created
throughout the economy. The state collected additional $168 million
in tax revenues. Rate of return was $14 for every one dollar of public
investment. |
BFP is critical in the early stages of company development
by providing financing and technical expertise. Clients developed
new products, built management teams, developed production capacity,
identified new markets and increased sales and profitability. |
|
| Trade
Adjustment Assistance Program (TAA), administered by The Economic
Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce |
Evaluation compared changes in employment and sales
for companies assisted by TAA centers to changes in eligible companies
that declined TAA assistance. |
Benefits for assisted companies include: higher survival
rates (84 percent versus 71 percent), added employment (4.2 percent
versus decline of 5.3 percent), sales growth (34 percent versus 16
percent). For each dollar invested through TAA, $87 in sales was generated. |
Program success is due to: extensive assistance at
a low cost to firm, participating firms investing their own money
and time in their recovery, program provided analysis of firm's strengths
and weaknesses. Caveats: Too much of TAA budget is spent on eligibility
versus assistance and there is a long backlog in getting assistance. |
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