Levin College of Urban Affairs

Cleveland State University

Cleveland, OH 44115

216 687-2367; FAX 216 687-9291

Tel Aviv University

Ramat Aviv, Israel

Last Revision: 5/15/96

Draft, not for quotation withoutthe authors' permission.

The authors thank Janet Smith (University of Illinois Chicago) for extensive editorial assistance.

Conflict around neighborhood revitalization initiatives is examined from the perspective of the residents' ability to formulate community goals and organize to pursue them. The basis for residents' ties to their community is considered a key factor shaping how they react to redevelopment-induced change. The ability to collectively respond to change is cast theoretically in terms of characteristics of selected communal linkages that affect unilateral and joint decision making processes during conflict. A dispute in a Cleveland neighborhood involving a hospital's attempt to expand without resident input is analyzed within this theoretical framework. A series of unilateral choices by the parties led to an outcome that surprised some and disappointed most of the parties involved. It is argued that, given the neighborhood's community ties, the reaction might have been anticipated and an outcome more satisfactory to all could have been achieved.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING
NEIGHBORHOOD REDEVELOPMENT CONFLICT

Planners and community advocates have an interest in understanding neighborhood conflict precipitated by public or private development initiatives. For those who embark on a project, regardless of scale, the ability to predict effects of a proposed action can increase the likelihood of implementation. Those who may be affected by change also value such insight to ensure a voice in the process and to claim a share of benefits. The theoretical interest in the unfolding and resolution of neighborhood disputes derives from the need to distinguish context-free from context-specific mechanisms for making negotiated decisions. For these reasons, planners should find the following framework useful for accessing neighborhood disputes surrounding redevelopment projects and for engaging in the practice of community conflict management.

Previous research on urban renewal amply documents the negative repercussions of projects that excluded community members from the decision making process (e.g., Gans, 1962; Greer, 1965; Keyes, 1969). The consequences of outsider-imposed change on communities is illustrated by the conflict that arises when gentrification of some central city neighborhoods produces displacement, particularly when those affected are of relatively low socioeconomic status and/or minorities (e.g., Hartman, Keating, and LeGates, 1982; Beauregard, 1985; Palen and London, 1984; Schill and Nathan, 1983). More recently, community development corporations (CDC) and public-private partnerships have become the primary source of projects intended to improve neighborhood conditions (Goetze, 1993; Walker, 1994). Community development corporations that engage in revitalization efforts to improve neighborhood conditions (Vidal, 1992) sometimes find themselves at odds with developers and act to stall change initiatives. While these efforts are likely to be "grassroots" in nature, there still is potential for conflict between developers and the community if residents are not involved in the decision making process.

Change in any neighborhood contains seeds for short- and long-term conflict, especially when residents have different values, life styles, incomes, religious or ethnic backgrounds (Suttles, 1968, 1972; Bell & Newby, 1973). The management of community conflict essentially involves assisting parties to make the best of their one-time or on-going situation, and to avert decisions destructive to individual and collective interests. Despite awareness of the potential for disputes when surrounding neighborhood redevelopment plans are proposed, there has been relatively little progress in using conflict management techniques to enable community participation in decision making processes. One reason may be lack of knowledge about context-specific conditions that shape neighborhood responses to development: what neighborhood factors encourage or hamper collective action? Another reason may be lack of process: what happens after change is initiated in a neighborhood, who is entitled to represent residents, and what are the channels for communication among stakeholders?

Initiators of a redevelopment project sometimes fail to garner needed local support because there is no clear correspondence between the physical neighborhood and social community, or at least this relationship does not exist at a sufficiently organized level (Reitzes & Reitzes, 1987). On the other hand, developers may be surprised to encounter effective opposition to their plans when they ignore a neighborhood’s social or communal aspects (Fisher, 1985; Hunter & Staggenborg, 1986; Kaufman & Smith, 1996). In both instances, the implied measure of community is the degree of attachment to the physical place. This suggests the ability of residents to react collectively to decisions expected to modify the physical and socioeconomic status quo could be assessed by examining communal ties in terms of their strength, and of the duration of the connections.

To address these questions, we examine conflict that occurs when various parties from within a community -- individuals, organizations, institutions -- decide to alter the status quo of a neighborhood. We propose that understanding the nature of communal ties among residents in a neighborhood can help predict reaction to redevelopment-induced conflict. Key to understanding this communal linkage are the boundaries that create neighborhood and community, which do not always overlap spatially or temporally. By this argument, mapping these linkages should shed light on the likely course of conflict and indicate options for its management. Such insight is valuable to planners and community development organizations as well as private developers wishing to revitalize neighborhoods.

In the first section, we devolp a conceptual framework for evaluating the nature of communal links that might account for a neighborhood's response to conflict and can help anticipate the residents’ ability to take collective action and participate in change decisions. In the second section, we illustrate how this framework can be used to analyze a dispute between residents in Cleveland's Tremont neighborhood and a hospital trying to remain viable by expanding its operation. Despite opportunities to cooperate, the stakeholders acted unilaterally toward an outcome neither party really predicted or desired. The parties’ interests in this conflict and their key actions which led to a disappointing outcome. We analyze from a decision making perspective the interests, knowledge, clout and community ties that may account for the missed opportunities. The last section summarizes our theoretical propositions and case findings, and suggests how planners might intervene to assist in the management of neighborhood redevelopment conflicts.

A Framework for Predicting Neighborhood Conflict

Conflict is not necessarily undesirable (see, for example, Rahim 1986; Kaufman & Duncan, 1988) but rather a ubiquitous social phenomenon accompanying change and progress (see for example Rubin, 1983). Early research on community conflict found disagreement indicative of community strength -- only people who do not care do not disagree (Coleman, 1957). Gamson (1966) also recognized a positive relationship between the frequency of controversies in a community and the degree of involvement of its residents, distinguishing towns with "rancorous" conflict fostering change and growth, from towns with "no rancorous" conflict and no change. A study of eighteen New England communities by Gamson (1966) supports this view. Gamson's conclusion was that the lack of conflict was not the sign of an "ideal" community. While the presence of conflict may indicate a community's ability to change and grow, it does not guarantee that conflict brought on by development activities will always be beneficial. Planning, conflict management and third party intervention may increase the likelihood of realizing the potential benefits of conflicts; however, making good use of these strategies requires the ability to anticipate community response and the unfolding of conflict.

Conflict research has identified individual and structural factors accounting for neighborhood responses to conflict. Coleman (1957), for example, found such responses to depend jointly on the characteristics of the community and the nature of issues in contention. Mika (1987) accounts for neighborhood conflict dynamics in terms of residents’ personal characteristics and the disputants’ social affiliations. To Bell & Newby (1973), neighborhood conflict appears to be affected by social stratification. With regard to conflict brought on by redevelopment, research on collective action at the neighborhood level often finds the residents’ length of tenure and economic status to be key in the definition and outcome of disputes (Davis, 1991; Heskin, 1991). While these observations enhance our understanding of what can drive collective behavior, they remain insufficient for anticipating when, and to what extent, conflict may erupt as the result of a proposed redevelopment project, because they fail to capture an essential aspect of a neighborhood’s reaction to change: its ability to respond in concert -- to act as a decision community. In order to identify this feature of a neighborhood, we need to first examine the relationship between residents and the place where they live.

 While the terms neighborhood and community are often used interchangeably, it is important to distinguish the physical place (neighborhood) from its social aspects (community) when discussing redevelopment conflict. Urban planners generally use the term "neighborhood" to refer to a clearly defined area within a larger region, often using census tracts or political jurisdiction to determine geographical boundaries. In contrast, a community is not necessarily place-based; it can be made up of people of similar ethnicity, religious affiliation, or cultural characteristics who may or may not share a common territory. In other words, social ties and territorial ties are two distinct dimensions of a neighborhood.

The traditional conceptualization of neighborhood is that it contains has a population of 5,000-10,000 people who are generally of similar socioeconomic status and ethnicity (Sawicki & Flynn, 1996), implying some degree of social interaction is expected. However, when trying to predict the potential for conflict and the likely path it might take, it should not be expected to find residents in a neighborhood acting collectively or in unison, perhaps especially in more diverse neighborhoods where there may be several communities occupying the same space. Initiators of a redevelopment project sometimes fail to garner needed local support because there is no clear correspondence between the physical neighborhood and social community, or at least this relationship does not exist at a sufficiently organized level (Reitzes & Reitzes, 1987). On the other hand, developers may be surprised to encounter effective opposition to their plans when they ignore a neighborhood’s social or communal aspects (Fisher, 1985; Hunter & Staggenborg, 1986; Kaufman & Smith, 1996). In both instances, the implied measure of community is the degree of attachment residents have to the neighborhood. By this argument, we should then be able to determine the ability of residents to react collectively to decisions expected to modify the physical and socioeconomic status quo by examining these communal ties.

A dimension that offers promise in predicting development-induced conflict is the nature -- strength and duration -- of these communal ties and how they affect residents’ response to redevelopment-induced change. While the relationship between community and neighborhood has been studied since the rise of the industrial city (REF), what has yet to be investigated is the link between residents’ communal ties and their ability to respond collectively to proposed change. To capture this aspect of the neighborhood-community connection, we begin by reviewing four distinct interpretations of the neighborhood-community relationship, to shed some light on how this relationship will affect residents’ collective response to a redevelopment project.

The identification of neighborhoods with communities (Connerly, 1985) was held normatively desirable by Mumford (1938) among others . For who advocated a return to family and neighborhood as antidotes to disorder and the growing obsession with money, technology and power he discerned in modern society. those who view neighborhoods as the environmental envelope of communities (Fried & Gleicher, 1961; Gans ; Hunter, 1974; Connerly, 1985) there is a general belief that some ties among residents will be preserved even when a neighborhood undergoes change over time (Bell & Newby 1973). Wellman and Leighton (1979) term this the "community saved", arguing that communal ties centralizing tendencies of may actually increase under certain circumstances when change is introduced (e.g., residents become unified in reaction to the rise of bureaucratic institutions, assisting others to cope with these institutions).

Some researchers presume that sharing institutions engenders community among neighborhood residents (Pelly Effrat, 1973), especially since people find it convenient to attend institutions located in the vicinity of residences, and/or, to select a residence in the vicinity of other members of an institution. Solidarity Institutions, such as public schools, that are uniformly attended may be more strongly rooted in a physical territory, while others that are attended by choice by individuals of similar economic, political or social interests (e.g., churches, synagogues, private schools, golf clubs) may be more mobile and connected to the people. Examples of communities moving and taking along their institutions suggest the institutional link may be more robust than the territorial one.

Others believe that cAd-hoc communitiesCCommunity-like links will emerge at times in response to perceived threats to common interests of individuals sharing an environment. Bridgeland and Sofranko (1975) argue that "community mobilization is a function of the structural features of communities as well as a function of issue characteristics in the communities." Such fleeting communities are captured by the issue-oriented argument that Neighbors whose ties -- work-based or family-based -- transcend the neighborhood boundaries (Wilkinson, 1986) where physical neighborhood "boundaries are fuzzy, the local society is dominated by extra-local ties and local action expresses private rather than collective interests." may temporarily act as a community when joining a fight against a reduction in services or the siting of some unwanted facility in their neighborhood (Kaufman & Smith, 1993).

Researchers who cast doubt on the existence of neighborhood-based communities note residents’ loose bond with their physical settings (Webber, 1963) and the limited scope of social action (Janowitz, 1967). The "community lost" is considered to be an outcome of industrialization and bureaucratization in Western societies, which weakened individual’s primary ties rendering them more narrowly instrumental than in traditional communities (Wellman and Leighton, 1979). As a result, residents shifted from relying on each other to relying on formal organizations for a measure of assistance (Castells, 1976), and therefore, are no longer capable of having any type of enduring social ties.

A limitation to these explanations is that each is usually held as a model for all situations. No allowance is made for neighborhood-community ties that vary from location to location or in time for the same location, or for more than one of the models to coexist in the same neighborhood. And, the basis for the community ties fluctuates in time along a continuum not captured by any of the four discrete models above. However, if the precise nature of community links in a neighborhood can help predict residents’ response to change, it is critical to recognize these possibilities and to examine the consequences of the mix of neighborhood-community ties for communication and for joint decision making.

In order to anticipate residents’ response to a proposed change prompted by redevelopment we have reframed past conceptualizations of the source of neighborhood-community correspondence to determine the extent to which residents can be expected to rally and make joint decisions regarding proposed change. Concerted response to change requires residents of a neighborhood to belong to decision communities. That is, residents need to have :

At one point of this continuum are well-known neighborhoods such as New York's Chinatown, Boston's North End or Cleveland's Slavic Village. Their uniqueness derives partly from the physical expression of the inhabitants' shared history; however, it stems primarily from the people's communality of culture and ethnic heritage, which is different from that of the rest of the city. This type of community is captured by Keller (1968) , who considers neighborhoods to be physically bounded areas having social networks and a concentrated use of local facilities as well as emotional and symbolic connotations for the residents. Clearly, not all neighborhoods fit this definition ever. Other neighborhoods evolved in such a way that the original community linkages no longer exists.

Assuming an elastic quality to neighborhood-community ties, to capture neighborhoods’ ability to act as decision-making communities, we recast the seemingly mutually exclusive types of neighborhood-community links presented above into a continuum along which the following categories are mileposts, distinguished by the strength, complexity and duration of community ties, whose non-discrete quality and susceptibility to change over time are highlighted.

A tight, multidimensional community fabric spanning several generations exists in neighborhoods whose residents share not only territory and facilities but also history and culture. Communities based on shared traditions depend critically on the continuity of the same group of people in the neighborhood. Consensus on the "good" of the community may be relatively easily reached. However, this is not the only aspect of communal strength. Effectiveness of response to change also requires knowledge of the external institutional system and ties with it, which is not necessarily a staple of such groups. Also, culturally unified communities may sometimes be economically diverse, making a single stand for or against development more difficult if it appears to unfairly affect a particular income group.

Table 1 displays characteristics that clarify the nature of communal links among neighborhood residents: basis of communality, nature of ties and their life span, and the key factor accounting for cohesion. These dimensions affect incentives and channels for communication, which in turn have an impact on the capability of people residing in each other’s proximity to respond to redevelopment initiatives as decision-making communities. Some level of communal relationships is assumed to be almost always present in a neighborhood, providing vital support to residents even if ineffectual in forming a stand for or against redevelopment. Communal ties are not static over a neighborhood's life-span. Analysis can reveal which component, whether the historical/traditional, the institutional or the ad-hoc interest is present and even dominant at any time. This information can help predict the course of redevelopment conflict in a neighborhood.

Based on the dimensions in Table 1, we hypothesize that effective community response to change emerges mostly from neighborhoods whose residents belong to some definable community, whether institutionally-based or interest-based. Response effectiveness hinges on the existence of the necessary communication channels for concerted action, and on the ability to access institutions affecting redevelopment decisions. Table 2 summarizes how these characteristics are likely to affect the ability of the neighborhood to come to consensus on the community good, and potential limitations of each community type with regard to collective decision making.

We expect the presence of several communities in one neighborhood to render consensus more difficult. Neighborhoods in transition between the four states are likely to harbor several kinds of community links (e.g., both institutional and interests). They are expected to experience difficulties reaching consensus because the presence of different grounds for community ties can exacerbate dissension among residents when concerted action is sought. For example, consensus reached by territory/institution-based communities rests primarily on the aim of protecting the shared territory. Interest-dominated communities will generally find consensus around the protection of an (individual) interest within the shared territory. Residents tied to the community through its institutions see their individual concerns as congruent with those of the community, while those who only view it as the location of an investment interpret any change first in terms of how their investment might be affected.

If interests of several kinds are at odds within the same neighborhood and none dominates, residents are still expected to react to change. However, the likelihood of reaching consensus is diminished since several voices represent different interests. It will depend critically on the disputants' negotiating skills, power and expectations, and on their ability to devise solutions that satisfy both their own interests and those of the other communities in the neighborhood whose support they need. In a neighborhood where both interest-based and institution-based communities coexist, successful alliances can be formed to make joint decisions in a given dispute if interest-based community members are able to reframe the issues in terms of how each will affect the institution-based community. In the next section we compare one neighborhood's reaction to redevelopment efforts to our predictions based on the link between the presence of a decision-making community and its response to conflict.

To illustrate the potential benefits of applying the neighborhood conflict framework, we analyze a dispute that occurred in Cleveland’s Tremont neighborhood when Grace Hospital tried to expand and change the nature of its facility without consulting residents in 1987. In the midst of financial problems, the multi-purpose community hospital sought to become a national spine treatment center and failed. While the story itself is several years old, the conditions which perpetuated the dispute are contemporary, especially given the level of public and private redevelopment efforts occuring in central cities nationwide. Furthermore, This example reveals the variability of resident and organization behavior that might not be anticipated in a single, well-defined neighborhood and illustrates how the conflict outcome, which disappointed all parties, might have been predicted based on the nature of Tremont’s communal linkages.

Stakeholders in a dispute experience a sequential unfolding of events. Their perspectives are shaped to a large extent by their stakes and perceptions of alternatives, contingencies and decision rules (Kaufman & Duncan, 19908; Carroll & Payne, 1989). The observer/analyst lacks the stakes, thereby gaining freedom of analysis but potentially missing the reasons for choices as they appeared to stakeholders during the conflict. In retrospect, some decisions seem irrational even to the stakeholder who made them while other decisions appear rational in the stakeholder’s hindsight. We attempt to capture both the observer’s and the stakeholders’ vantage points in the Tremont-Grace Hospital dispute by analyzing the conflict in terms of its context, the parties involved and the process.

The Tremont neighborhood is located immediately south of downtown Cleveland. Its history and the nature of its community are discussed next in the terms proposed in Table 1. The parties to the conflict are described with their preferences, actual and perceived clout, standing in the community, resources (including informational and others such as city connections), and the outcomes sought. Neighborhood residents, a few outsiders and the hospital were direct parties with tangible stakes in the outcome. There were also a few indirect parties, intervenors or others whose choices could have affected conflict outcomes (e.g., public opinion formed by newspaper articles, city officials, state government officials). Finally, the conflict process itself is described in terms of the choices stakeholders made in time, their effectiveness and their consequences; the decision rules they used; and, the institutional channels, laws, and procedures that applied to this dispute.

Tremont is an older inner-city neighborhood experiencing the symptoms of decline: an aging and dwindling population, high rates of poverty and unemployment, deteriorating housing stock, and high incidents of arson and crime. However, Tremont differs in several respects from other declining neighborhoods. Relatively small in scale, it borders on downtown Cleveland, yet is geographically isolated by natural and artificial barriers. It is ethnically diverse, which is expressed spatially in the numerous churches built over time to accommodate the various congregations. Its location adjacent to Cleveland’s redeveloping downtown, and some of its old housing which continues to be amenable to restoration, have made it a prime candidate for gentrification Process whereby middle-income and upper-middle income whites (and some blacks) are buying and restoring old homes and new houses (Palen & London, 1984; Beauregard, 1985; London, Barrett & Lipton (1986).

At the turn of the century, Cleveland’s industry base expanded and waves of Eastern European immigrants sought employment, settling in the compact, high-density, low-cost houses near factories. Since immigrants chose to live near their places of works rather than within cultural kinship, each new group built its own institutional base, creating an ethnic mosaic that has been Tremont’s hallmark, although the composition changed in time. After the early residents aged and moved out, many homes were either maintained to varying degrees as rental property, sold for rental property, abandoned or burned, resulting in numerous vacant lots and an intense arson-for-profit activity in the 1970s.

As in other Cleveland neighborhoods twenty years ago, residents of Tremont organized to combat declining conditions. The Tremont West Development Corporation (TWDC), a federation of neighborhood organizations (block clubs, tenant associations, merchant groups and churches) was established for community action on housing rehabilitation, arson and crime (Miggins, 1984). During this time, new groups including Appalachian, African-American, Middle-Eastern, and Asian came to Tremont. Some artists and young professionals who made their home there were considered by TWDC to be forerunners of gentrification, expected to raise property values and enhance the quality of life but also threaten to displace low-income residents (Beauregard, 1985). Fears were partly allayed by the large proportion of new residents buying property (close to 50%), which TWDC perceived to be a stabilizing trend since the newcomers appeared committed to preserving Tremont's rich socioeconomic mix.

Between 1970 and 1980, Tremont had lost 37% of its population. By 1980, there were 10,304 residents and 4,915 housing units. The rate of home ownership had decreased with owners occupying only 27% of all units while 52% were renter occupied. The only significant increase registered was in vacant units, which more than doubled in ten years. The racial composition in 1980 remained majority white (80% white, 12% other race, and 8% black). While Tremont had never been a wealthy neighborhood, its median income continued to decrease as middle- and upper-income households moved out, leaving a large proportion of residents below poverty (31% in 1980 and nearly 43% in 1990).

In 1987, Ethnic and socioeconomic heterogeneity is increasing with gentrification. Poverty of resources and image (as a high-crime, high-arson area), occasional racial tensions and lack of consensus on direction for the future remain chief problems.

when Grace Hospital began implementing its expansion plan, TWDC was seeking a slow, controlled, small-scale approach to redevelopment that would preserve Tremont’s unique characteristics and would not alter the community’s character, nor displace any segment of it. There was, however, no neighborhood-wide consensus over Tremont's direction for the future. The divided interests, which are discussed in the next section, clearly contributed to the handling of the dispute we study here and reflect the multiplicity of neighborhood-community ties exhibited in Tremont at that time.

In the terms of Table 1, Tremont's initial Eastern European residents belonged to groups within which ties were of historical/cultural nature. Among these groups, ties were mostly of shared territory and institutions such as schools and churches. In time, institutional community links became dominant as groups lost members in the second generation and had to close down some neighborhood facilities while sharing the rest. For example, after their church closed, children of Greek heritage began attending the Ukrainian church and parochial school.

By the mid-1980s, residents in Tremont had at least two clearly different forms of community ties: fading linkages based on shared territory and institutions lingered among older residents who were being replaced by new immigrants whose ties were based on common interests such as protecting property investment, the preservation of some historical structures, and safety. Given the diverse communities within Tremont, we predict joint decisions could have emerged. While difficult to obtain, consensus was not precluded if the different communities in the neighborhood chose to rally around common issues or trade support for specific issues. Some evidence of why consensus was not reached in the dispute at hand is found in the stakeholders who represented different sides in the Tremont dispute.

Any story of a conflict can be told in as many ways as there were stakeholders. In the Tremont dispute, we focus on the active parties whose decisions affected the course and outcome of the conflict: the hospital who triggered the dispute with its attempt to acquire property for its expansion, neighborhood residents, and some nonresidents associated with either the neighborhood organization or the hospital. Despite the appearance of only two major sides -- the hospital and the neighborhood -- the neighborhood had both supporters and opponents of the hospital expansion.

Grace hospital was built in 1938 as a 87-bed acute care facility. It expanded in 1950 and again in 1983, when financial difficulties began as the entire Cleveland area hospital system experienced patient and revenue losses. That year, a Blue Cross & Blue Shield-commissioned report targeted Grace for closing or at least dropping of full coverage contracts. As its daily occupancy dropped to 22%, Grace had to take some action for survival.

In April, 1987, Glenbeigh took over management of Grace Hospital through its subsidiary, Longford Hospital Management Services. It planned to turn Grace into a center for treatment of spinal and arthritis ailments. The project included expansion of the current facility, a new parking lot and possibly building a new hotel for visitors. Longford hired architects, initiated property purchases, filed documents with State and City permitting agencies and hired lawyers to assist them with the intricacies of the various permitting processes required for such a development. For example, the state of Ohio examines all hospital expansion proposals exceeding $1.5 million to issue a certificate of need, meant to prevent duplication of existing services. Also, Cleveland's City Landmarks Commission reviews requests for demolition to protect historic structures. The hospital's expansion plan slated for acquisition and demolition the Ukrainian-American Center, a designated historical landmark.

The key to Grace’s expansion plan was the presence in Cleveland of a neurosurgeon and an orthopedic surgeon, both willing to leave their employment at other area hospitals and provide the expertise needed to attract a national clientele for the new spinal center. The doctors' interests, although concurrent with Grace's, did not entirely depend on this particular hospital, while the changes proposed by Grace did hinge on the doctors' presence. Since both doctors had proved they could attract patients and revenue, several area hospitals in addition to Grace would have been willing to accommodate their demands.

While Grace Hospital acted monolithically, the ethnically and economically heterogeneous neighborhood was divided. Although the community could have expected some benefits from the expansion plan, there was also risk of harm to some residents’ interests. The investment in the hospital, hotel and parking lot could snowball and attract more investment. Jobs were also a prospect, albeit uncertain, since outside employees and former associates of the two core doctors could displace residents. The main expected negative effect was on rental prices. A similar transition had been experienced when the Cleveland Clinic developed some of its surrounding neighborhoods east of downtown.

Supporters of the hospital plan included older residents whose only hope to recover some property value other than through arson was to sell to Grace for demolition. St. Augustine Church, an organization with high status in the community, which provided assistance to the needy and services for deaf persons in the Cleveland area, also supported the expansion, allegedly because it expected Grace to increase its contribution to the soup kitchen. St. Augustine’s position gained Grace the support of clientele from outside the neighborhood who benefited from the church's services.

Opponents to the expansion feared it would damage the slow-paced revitalization championed by TWDC. They also felt Tremont's lifestyle would be overwhelmed by Grace's rapid development, losing its sense of community, its low-income members and the uniqueness prized by current dwellers. Opponents especially objected to Grace's plan to buy and demolish a whole block of about 100 housing units including Pelton Apartments, a historical building. Purchase of the Pelton building, in fact, triggered the active phase of the dispute discussed in the next section.

One nonresident aligned with the TWDC was in the process of closing on several properties he planned to redevelop for upscale rental housing and commercial units when the dispute erupted. His opposition to Grace was due to the surge in the real estate prices as the hospital bought property. This party, who had acquired considerable clout with TWDC, contributed to the polarization of the dispute by fiercely opposing any strategies to resolve the conflict, including mediation, which might have allowed Grace to expand. In the eyes of TWDC, this stakeholder’s plans for redevelopment were different than Grace’s partly because TWDC members were convinced his projects were consonant with their vision of Tremont, while Grace’s were not.

The division within the neighborhood surfaced when TWDC's contention of representing all Tremont was questioned by some of the residents. Often in a complex dispute a party may view its opponent as a unitary decision maker rather than as a multi-party entity. The opposite happened here: as a control strategy, TWDC misrepresented itself as unitary, and attributed any opposition to the irrationality of some residents. Active members of TWDC believed they knew what was best for the neighborhood and attempted to represent parties they had not consulted, due partly to lack of negotiating skills. Instead of working to understand, persuade and accommodate, TWDC members discounted or maligned dissenters. This alienated and drove several passive parties into Grace’s camp, undermining TWDC's action capability and reducing its options. Natural divisions along institutional affiliations and interests were enhanced, eliminating the possibility for reaching consensus.

Disputants are expected by analysts and by opponents alike to behave as a unit. However, the expectation is not always met even when parties actively work to project unity of purpose and choice, as do teams in international negotiations. Grace Hospital behaved like a formal organization, managing to present a coherent front even in the face of internal disagreement. In contrast, TWDC projected a unified front, which seriously misled stakeholders and limited the role conflict management could play. As a non-elected entity that consulted with select residents on preferred strategies and discredited dissenters, TWDC represented only one community within Tremont, not the entire neighborhood.

TWDC differed from Grace in its lines of authority and decision making procedures. The largely volunteer organization had a more democratic and less formal structure than Grace, but it also had more leeway to change course. Nonetheless, there is similarity between the two: both Grace and TWDC sought continued survival as organizations, a goal that prompted actions not always beneficial, and possibly detrimental, to their constituents. Grace Hospital was only threatened financially, so its actions were driven by the goal of financial security. In contrast, TWDC’s very mandate was questioned by residents at odds with its view of the "good of the community," which in turn threatened its credibility with funding agencies and other residents. TWDC’s actions were partly driven by an intent to add success to its record of community service as a basis for continued operation. The next section considers the choices each party made in the Tremont dispute. Table 2 diagrams the sequence of events.

In May, 1987, Grace’s expansion plan became apparent to the neighborhood indirectly, when the hospital attempted to buy the Pelton Apartments building which at the time provided affordable rentals to lower income residents in Tremont. St. John Cantius church tried to prevent the sale by investing in the building to save it from demolition, but the hospital managed the purchase in June, 1987. The Pelton Tenants Association protested the sale and held candle light vigils. They were joined by the Tremont/Southside Coalition for Truth, composed of local merchants and concerned residents. The Coalition was supported by TWDC, although not all its members opposed the Grace expansion at the time.

TWDC contacted St. Augustine Church and the hospital management to discuss the expansion. In all, they met with reluctant Grace representatives about six times during 1987. , and even explored mediation possibilities perceived members of the hospital management as dishonest, trying to mislead about Grace's plans, and lacking good faith and desire to help the community.

TWDC's choices were grounded in the belief that no form of expansion would serve the neighborhood's interests. It briefly appeared to seek a joint decision making mode when it explored mediation. However, TWDC intended to use this as an information exchange that would allow them to act unilaterally to prevent Grace’s plan. Members did not view this strategy as devious, but rather as a clever attempt to even the odds against a powerful opponent. As stakeholders often will, TWDC members saw their demands as "clearly" justified, and "obviously" nonnegotiable, signaling lack of readiness for mediation. However, comments made later by some TWDC representatives and reportedly by some hospital officials suggest that, were it possible to replay this dispute, both parties might enter mediation.

Grace’s management also consistently chose unilateral action. It hired reputable Cleveland lawyers, which provoked hopelessness among TWDC leaders, who felt their lack of resources prevented them from adequately defending their constituents' interests. This led members to attempt to extract one-sided advice from the would-be mediator. Such advice would have disqualified the mediator from assisting in the joint decision process since she would have been unable to assure Grace of evenhandedness, especially since Whether or not mediator neutrality is always a must, in this case Grace was not a party in selecting mediation or the mediator. Therefore, the mediator told TWDC representatives that if the ultimate goal of consultations was mediation, she would have to refrain from giving one-sided advice. Instead, she outlined for TWDC a strategy for deciding whether mediation could help them, based on information about joint decision making and about what mediation could offer. However, to the end of the consultation TWDC members continued to frame the situation as a "fixed pie" with any form of hospital expansion cast as a loss to them. The only outcome that remained acceptable to them was a stop to Grace's plan, with any other alternatives viewed as unpalatable compromise. So TWDC opted out of mediation.

Grace Hospital's project was eventually doomed by the State of Ohio requirement of proving need for such a facility and the impact on the state health care system before carrying out any substantial expansion. To circumvent this step the hospital had framed its proposal in three separate packages so the cost of each fell below the State threshold for review. TWDC viewed the State requirement as one of its few hopes for delaying, if not preventing Grace from expanding, and insisted the smaller packages were in effect one big project qualified for State review. The lawyers for Grace Hospital were unsuccessful in dodging this charge and could only prepare for, but not expedite, the permitting process.

The hospital submitted to the review and then withdrew because the doctors that were instrumental to the new spinal treatment center "defected" to the Lutheran Medical Center of Cleveland. Their impatience and low expectations of a speedy and successful review, in effect, dealt Grace its defeat. Soon after the doctors left the project, Longford Hospital Management Services abandoned Grace. Lutheran Hospital could not produce the center for the two doctors, who continued working in Cleveland. Glenbeigh, who had managed the hospital through its Longford subsidiary, overextended and recently filed for bankruptcy.

The hospital came again under the threat of closure. Considering this a loss to the neighborhood, worried TWDC members met with the team that took over the hospital’s management in 1989. TWDC offered to help the hospital in whatever way it could to overcome its financial troubles in order to stay open. The new management has been able so far to keep the hospital afloat by identifying special niches -- services such as skilled nursing, long-term acute care, occupational therapy, and pain management it provides at a lower cost than other area hospitals. However, Grace remains financially vulnerable in a rapidly changing environment.

The new hospital management appears to have learned from the past. It is currently trying to become a full partner in the Tremont neighborhood, and to regain the trust lost in the 1987 dispute. It has initiated a community-wide assessment of health needs and is taking the lead in helping social services respond to needs and identify resources, and if funds become available, plans to transform the historical Ukrainian-American Center it owns into a community resource center. Management has even advised the nursing home contractor with an option on the Pelton Apartments building to go to the community before making any changes and to assist in relocating those who will be displaced.

Conflict Outcome

Every dispute is unique in circumstances, mix of stakeholders with their preferences and choices, sequence of events and outcomes, yet single-context disputes are assumed to have some characteristics in common. For example, disputes within a neighborhood are frequently personal in nature (Pruitt and Kressel, 1985), multi-party, often with racial, ethnic or religious overtones, and involve residents living in close proximity who sometimes use violence or the threat of it (Mika, 1987).

The redevelopment dispute described does not neatly match this description. Specifically:

• the dispute trigger is similar to environmental siting conflicts where a controversial initiative elicits a collective "not in my back yard" response;
• the stakeholders were not individuals, but rather community groups with problems of participation, representation, and even misrepresentation;
• the process consisted of unilateral decisions leading to an outcome that pleased none of the stakeholders but that left an opening for future joint decision making.

The likely course of the redevelopment-induced conflict in Tremont would have been anticipated due to the existence and nature of multiple community links, and the dynamics in the neighborhood. This is consistent with our prediction that in a heterogeneous neighborhood consensus is sensitive to the level of negotiation skills of the parties. While consensus was not precluded in Tremont, it was far from guaranteed by community membership, as it might be in a historical/cultural community, and it was not easily obtained, as in a homogeneous, single interest-based community. Based on this diagnosis, conflict management tools should have included enhanced communication and community building, as well as third party intervention.

TWDC's decision to represent all residents in the dispute without first gaining consensus on the neighborhood’s welfare exacerbated the conflict. Furthermore, the hospital and TWDC appeared more intent on thwarting the opponent's plans than on identifying a mutually acceptable outcome and enabling the "good of Tremont" to prevail. However, lack of negotiations clearly served at least some stakeholders at least temporarily. Both organizations pursued unilateral strategies key to the disappointing outcome. Two reasons may explain why unilateral actions appeal to neighborhood dispute stakeholders even when joint decisions appear to hold more long-term promise for all: a misperception that unilateral strategies are effective, and the failure to recognize conflict as a negotiation.

The first reason stakeholders opt for unilateral moves is that they perceive such moves as effective in leaving them in full control and leading to their most preferred outcome at the least cost. Tactics such as discrediting the opponent, inflicting costs, exploiting institutionalized channels and attempting to keep full control over decisions that affect others appear to many to enhance chances of reaching the preferred outcome. They may rely on public opinion (called in through the local press for instance) as if it could help directly. The net result of bias toward unilateral moves is neglect of joint, potentially mutually beneficial strategies, by organizations such as TWDC, with few negotiating skills, or Grace with management skills in the different areas of finance and law rather than in negotiations with an host community. While Grace and TWDC both acted in ways they perceived as most effective, they merely reacted to the opponent's unilateral choices instead of actively seeking mutually acceptable options.

Grace’s expansion plan could have contributed to resolving some of Tremont's problems. It could have improved Tremont’s image and ability to make the most of its proximity to Cleveland's redeveloping downtown. However, lulled by a rather narrow interpretation of "Tremont’s good", and assuming these community benefits were obvious and assured, Grace management overlooked a critical step in the process: dialogue with the neighborhood prior to implementation of its plan. A savvier management would have realized the need to communicate with and persuade the neighborhood, and explore joint ways to benefit from the project. Those who proceed without consulting their hosts often end up facing prolonged, costly litigation and other delaying tactics, as happened in Tremont.

The second reason for the neglect of joint processes may be that the parties fail to identify a conflict as a negotiation (Carroll and Payne, 1989). The hospital management proceeded with plans and made purchases without consulting representatives of community interests, because it thought it could. Grace underestimated TWDC's resources and commitment but also its preferences. Grace viewed the expansion as benefiting Tremont, and therefore in tune with the goals of TWDC and the community, thus obviating the need to consider negotiation. In turn, TWDC saw itself as the true champion of "Tremont’s good" (even though neighborhood residents challenged the organization on this point), and also assumed the most effective approach was unilateral action, divorced from residents’ input. Members of TWDC used laws and regulations to force the state review process, thinking the institutional path could slow or even stop the project. Neither party felt the need to communicate with the other or with Tremont’s residents to confirm its notion of "Tremont’s good." Nor did either party recognize that it could have achieved its goals through negotiations with the other.

The outcome of the Tremont conflict, which did not completely satisfy anyone, was unstable. Grace’s size and location remained unchanged, while its financial status grew more precarious and its reputation in the community was damaged. TWDC members recognized that their actions could have led to the hospital’s closing, an unwelcome byproduct of their "victory." However, the distributive nature of the outcome is similar to that of litigation, which comes down on one side (the winner), typically leaving other parties (the losers) unsatisfied and poised for further fights. TWDC chose the institutional path both because it was dismayed by Grace's unilateral decisions, and because it came to distrust any information that Grace supplied on its plans. Any loss from the choice of strategies can only be assessed if the stakeholders could adequately recollect their circumstances, apply their 1987 preferences to alternative scenarios based on joint decision making and find them more desirable than the actual outcome.

The conflict process had some merit because the parties became educated about each other and about joint decision making. At the very least, stakeholders understood some of the perils of acting unilaterally. And at the time, if a similar confrontation were to reoccur, the same parties would likely attempt to a joint decision making process to seek a mutually satisfactory outcome. As current conditions demonstrate, the adversarial stance was defused and future contact was possible. This learning effect of community conflicts could benefit form further investigation.

Attention must be given to the effects of time over the course of long-drawn disputes such as in Tremont, where changes happened in the configuration, preferences and perceptions of stakeholders. During the year-long confrontation, external events caused shifts in the composition and alignment of groups, letting outcomes emerge that might have been inconceivable at the outset. For example, the TWDC had attempted since its inception in 1976 to define the neighborhood's future direction so as to cultivate a slow and planned redevelopment of Tremont. During the dispute with Grace Hospital, and perhaps as a result of it, residents' expectations of Tremont's redevelopment seem to have changed. Nowadays the climate appears supportive of gentrification trends.

The economic, social and demographic changes Tremont underwent in time seeded the potential for conflict by increased the neighborhood’s heterogeneity, creating new needs, exacerbating tensions and reconfiguring the power distribution. The case supports the assertion that conflict at the neighborhood level needs management for realizing positive outcomes and for avoiding destructive ones. In Tremont, by the parties' own testimony, conflict did not lead to the best outcome that could be obtained under the circumstances, but neither was it destructive. TWDC's actions increased awareness and some participation (even though not always on the side of TWDC) and catalyzed resident involvement, which led to the questioning of TWDC vision of the "good of Tremont." This finding is similar to Coleman's (1957) contention that community disagreements are a sign of strength.

Both key parties in the Tremont conflict missed opportunities for a better outcome. Neighborhood representation by the Tremont West Development Corporation did not include all residents and was short-sighted, focusing on defeating the opponent rather than obtaining advantages for the neighborhood. TWDC even allowed a non-resident with a vested interest in the area to sway the direction of the group, often to further his own goals. While diversity of perceptions, needs, and community ties does not preclude neighborhood consensus, TWDC seemed unaware of the need to foster it. Several years later, social service providers in Tremont are acutely aware of the need to communicate and coordinate initiatives. Grace’s determination in regaining community trust attests to learning at the institutional rather than individual level, since the current management was not present during the conflict. An area of inquiry that remains to be explored is the extent and duration of the learning that occurs in neighborhoods as a result of redevelopment conflict.

Recommendations For Planners

The typology of decision communities and the case presented here offer insight for any individual or organization proposing a redevelopment project as well as those parties who could be affected by it. Anyone proposing to change neighborhood conditions needs to recognize the nature and extent of communal ties in a neighborhood in order to understand how residents are likely to respond collectively. Those seeking to intervene in conflict and alter its course need to know which individual and collective decision ingredients are susceptible to change. They also need to equip themselves with skills that can enhance the decision making process, such as communication, organization, negotiation, and reframing goals in terms of stakeholders’ needs and interests rather than opponents’ losses.

While planners were not involved in the Tremont dispute, it would have been within their mandate to intervene in the decision process since land use change is usually part of the planners’ domain, not to mention that a neighborhood within their jurisdiction is a constituent eligible for planning services. Yet planners in a public agency are not necessarily consulted in every land use change decision, especially if formal public involvement is not required as it is when a request is made for a zoning variance, extension of services, or infrastructure improvement. Even when the need for planner involvement is recognized, it may occur late in the decision process when the project is well advanced. Under such circumstances, it is not unrealistic to expect planners to intervene in redevelopment decisions only when required by the rules or specifically requested by some stakeholder. However, given the potential for conflict when the process is not inclusive, planners may want to consider a proactive role in redevelopment decisions using the full extent of their mandate.

Public agency planners are well positioned to analyze a situation and determine the necessary degree of intervention. Even if they come late into the process or when conflict has erupted, planners should be able to evaluate redevelopment-induced change and try to reduce the likelihood that those affected will be dissatisfied with the outcome or the decision process. A key step that can assist planners in gauging when intervention might benefit the change process is stakeholder analysis. It can reveal the extent and quality of participation in the decision process, and point to opportunities for planner involvement. Stakeholder analysis also helps planners identify whether their constituents are adequately represented, and to diagnose whether change proponents are facing a decision community that can hold its own or a neighborhood whose residents are in need of representation assistance. The following questions should be of assistance.

An example of stakeholder analysis is offered below by means of a set of questions

• Who is not included or represented in the decision making process? The parties likely to be affected by a redevelopment project are not always included in the discussion leading up to implementation. This should include not only those parties that will be directly affected, but also those who may be indirectly impacted, as well as future interests that are not necessarily tangible. Some are simply overlooked or assumed to favor the project. Others are actively excluded to reduce opposition to plans. Yet others are not recognized as legitimate stakeholders or are evaluated as powerless or unable to participate. Regardless of the reason for exclusion, the lack of representation is undesirable for several reasons including narrow instrumental ones – excluded stakeholders can damage process and outcome in the short run – as well as broader ones – lack of intergenerational justice or long run neglect of regional environmental and infrastructure concerns. In Tremont, the City's and State's health care provision concerns were utterly neglected until the TWDC saw them strategically as a way to prevent Grace Hospital from implementing its plans. Proactive planners intervene to correct lack of stakeholder representation by either calling for inclusion, or taking upon themselves tor represent interests absent at the negotiation table.
• What is the quality of representation for the various stakeholders? Depending on the nature of communal ties, some interest groups affected by a change intiative may be very adept at participating, while others may need various levels of assistance with access to information and resources to make their case. This inquiry is useful regardless of the complexity of communal ties, helping to clarify the different positions within a neighborhood. It can also reveal illegitimate representation as happened in Tremont. In neighborhoods harboring several communities with interests seemingly at odds, planners may help resolve the conflict among groups enabling concerted response to redevelopment change.
• What are the interests at stake? Who will benefit from the redevelopment project? More specifically, are residents living in the neighborhood likely to benefit, whether in the short or long run? While most redevelopment claims to improve neighborhood conditions, the benefits if any may come at some expense, as in Tremont where the hospital expansion required demolishing low-cost, affordable housing. Regardless of whether a for-profit or nonprofit entity proposes a redevelopment project, the neighborhood residents' costs and benefits should be assessed. Planner intervention is necessary especially if there is reason to doubt the claimed benefits,. take one of the following forms, depending on the preferred level of involvement. A general recommendation is to assess the degree to which an affected neighborhood can hold its own and then act accordingly. In general, planners can provide an analysis of alternative outcomes that might at times undermine exaggerated claims but might also lend needed credibility where warranted, helping the case of some change proponents.
• Who will make the key decisions? (The balance of power. Even is not necessarily desirable -- it may mean stalemate.)
• What are the planner's interests served by intervention?
• What will be the effect of planner intervention on the interests at stake? Altering is not necessarily legit

To sumarize, at a minimum planners should scrutinize and monitor critical redevelopment initiatives, and intervene at the request of stakehodlers. Proactive intervention is warranted when analysis indicates that some stakeholders are in need of representation and access to information and institutional power. Planner intervention In the Tremont case, this might have included assessing whether or not the anticipated spin-off development and employment was likely to occur, and under what circumstances.Planners can also provide information and findings to residents who may or may not be aware of the project, and are likely to have some concerns. While this may stir up controversy, it is also necessary and useful where opposition to a project appears to be rooted in misinformation or limited understanding of potential benefits. This is not to say planners should persuade residents to support a project, only that they are in a good position to expand the level and accuracy of information that might otherwise be incomplete.A more extreme form of intervention, Planners may even choose advocacy on behalf of neighborhood residents who do not belong to a decision community or do not appear ready to act on their own behalf. Such intervention is fraught with problems especially when several neighborhood groups in need of assistance are at odds.

The Tremont dispute illustrates how a redevelopment project in older urban neighborhoods can lead to protracted community conflict. The case and its aftermath offer an initial test of our hypothesized link between the nature of a neighborhood's community ties and its reaction to change. In Tremont, ethnic and economic diversity and the resulting mix of institutional-based and interest-based communal ties made consensus on the community's good difficult to reach. Of course, this assumes that a cohesive position regarding the redevelopment project can be formulated. Determining "the neighborhood’s" position may not always be feasible with complex communal ties or a multiplicity of groups. Therefore, if it is not possible to accurately gauge the neighborhood-community link, then advocating for the neighborhood may not be recommended.The planners' decision to intervene in such disputes is quite complex and contingent on a variety of personal, organizational and political considerations including mandate, position in the agency, and political support for a proactive stance. However, one key consideration has to be need and prospects of a neighboorhood in the absence of planner assistance. The community links typology developed here provides a starting point for assessing this need and for anticipating the course of the decision process involved in any redevelopment action. It offers a means to diagnose the degree to which a neighborhood contains a decision community, and to determine what form of planner intervention might benefit the process.

While the Tremont case supports the thesis that the nature of communal ties affect how a neighborhood responds to redevelopment-induced change, further research is needed to verify that planner intervention utilizing the framework presented here can help protracted conflict. This involves documenting redevelopment situations that are sufficiently similar so that the effect of planner intervention on process and outcome can be assessed. For planners working in a public agency, applying this knowledge is expected to reduce the potential magnitude of conflict. More importantly, these guidelines should increase the chances for a satisfactory outcome for all -- both the initiators of change and those who would be affected by it -- by assuring that a sound decision making process is followed.Research of this kind might also yield some useful additional recommendations for planners regarding strategic issues such as the timing of their intervention, the extent to which the appearance of neutrality is necessary, and ways to foster the stakeholders' trust.

Predictions based on our theoretical framework for communal linkages in neighborhoods were consistent with events in the Tremont-Grace Hospital dispute. However, further refinements of the framework should be tested against a variety of cases to pinpoint and substantiate key variables for prediction beyond the communal linkages presented here. For those seeking the ability to affect the course of conflict that might stem from redevelopment efforts, whether as community organizers or initiators of change from within or outside the neighborhood, and whose community ties could support consensus, attention should be given to decision ingredients susceptible to change. These include resources and skills such as communication, organization and negotiation, and a reframing of goals in terms of stakeholders' needs rather than in terms of opponent losses. Regardless of who initiates redevelopment or the project scale, a sound process can reduce recourse to unilateral strategies and promote joint decision making, increasing chances of a satisfactory outcome.

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