To date, attention to conflict surrounding the siting of locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) has produced guidelines and strategies for the siting process, including planner intervention. It is proposed that the task of changing an existing unwanted land use has not received equal attention and poses special problems for parties involved in the decision making process. The issues, the space of alternative solutions, and some consequences of limited planner involvement are illustrated with a case: the closing down of the GSX Chemical Services of Ohio hazardous waste processing facility in Cleveland. The unpredictability and poor quality of outcomes as well as the costs of conflict to the host community illustrated by this case suggest the need for proactive planner participation in such changes. We use the GSX case to examine what is specific to change in existing unwanted land uses and what could benefit from planners’ skills and their position as active negotiators on behalf of the public interest. We explore some ways in which planner intervention could enable a transparent decision making process that is inclusive of all concerns, whether represented or not, and that is based on accurate and shared information.

In October 1990, GSX Chemical Services of Ohio ceased treating hazardous waste at its Cleveland facility in the midst of several court cases spurred by installation of an incinerator at the site. The decision to completely shut down the facility came abruptly, after months of public debate between GSX and community members opposed to the incinerator. For many of those involved in the dispute, the final decision to close the facility was neither predictable nor satisfying. In retrospect, some parties to the conflict recognized that the outcome was a result of reactive decisions that had ignored alternatives and unrepresented regional concerns.

The closing of GSX presents a complex dilemma for planners involved in efforts to change an existing unwanted land use. There is currently no formal call for planners to participate in such situations, although planner intervention could benefit the decision making process in several ways. First, planning skills may be useful in identifying issues and inventing alternative solutions. Second, planners have, or can assume, a mandate to represent certain interests that otherwise are rarely present at the negotiation table. Third, and key to the case and to our recommendations, planners can assist the decision and negotiation process, to increase the likelihood that parties are satisfied with process and outcome.

We examine here the decisions that preceded the closing of GSX’s Cleveland facility, identifying points where planner intervention might have benefited the process. We profile the case as a means for considering opportunities for planner involvement in similar efforts to implement unwanted change to an existing land use. We begin with the sequence of events and discuss the outcome in terms of its effects on key stakeholders in the dispute and on unrepresented interests. We proceed to compare features of the GSX case with a related problem -- the siting of unwanted land uses, or LULUs -- to identify characteristics unique to processes of changing existing unwanted land uses that might warrant a specific design. We consider the transferability of LULU siting strategies to assist planners working in public agencies to intervene in land use change decisions. Finally, we identify entry points for planner intervention that might improve the decision process following initiatives to change an existing unwanted land use.

Until the summer of 1990, when it closed, the GSX facility in Cleveland prepared for disposal a variety of hazardous waste materials. The controversy preceding its closure arose when the community became aware of GSX’s effort to obtain a permit for incinerating hazardous waste at the site. A key point of contention was the classification of the proposed technology, which the company claimed was technically not incineration. A protracted court battle ensued, bringing into the dispute facility owners and management, a group of neighborhood residents, an ad hoc organization started by suburban residents opposed to the incinerator, and various public officials from state, county and local government.

The GSX case unfolded over ten years. The facility, located in the North Broadway community area southeast of downtown Cleveland, began its existence as Alchem-Tron, Inc. We present the sequence of events that led to the closure of GSX, followed by an analysis of the outcome with respect to key stakeholders involved in the dispute preceding the decision to close the site.

The Waste Treatment Facility

North Broadway, long home to Cleveland industry and its workers, has changed over the years as industrial facilities in the neighborhood closed or relocated. However, its socioeconomic makeup remained relatively stable during the period when the hazardous waste treatment facility was in operation. As of 1990, the neighborhood was still predominantly white (92%), although no longer the Polish enclave it had been in the past. Both median income ($17,951) and housing values ($33,000) were well below the city-wide median. Most of the housing stock was built between the turn of the century and World War II, so the resulting land use pattern was a mixture of heavy industry and residential. Alchem-Tron was one of several land uses in the neighborhood that residents might have labeled "unwanted," including an asphalt plant next door and a medical waste treatment facility down the street, as well as a nearby steel plant and a large public housing development.

Alchem-Tron

In 1981, Alchem-Tron, Inc. was permitted to "store hazardous wastes in tanks and containers, to distill and blend hazardous waste solvents in tanks, and to fix and solidify hazardous wastes" (Ohio Environmental Protection Agency, 1990) using open air drying beds. The State of Ohio granted the operating permit without a public hearing, which might be why residents were not initially aware or concerned about Alchem-Tron transporting and treating hazardous waste in their neighborhood.

From the outset, Alchem-Tron’s relationship with state and local officials was problematic. The owner was cited repeatedly for lax handling of materials and less-than-full attention to regulations of hazardous waste treatment and storage. Alchem-Tron management responded reluctantly to violations, and usually only after the City of Cleveland or the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) undertook some form of legal action.

The facility underwent changes as new technology was introduced to increase capacity and to meet increasing regulatory requirements. Following a consent agreement with the City’s Division of Air Pollution Control at the end of 1983, Alchem-Tron proposed building a structure to cover its waste drying area and installing new technology in order to reduce airborne emissions. The City approved the plan. In 1986 Alchem-Tron installed a new thermal drying bed unit which was later classified an incinerator under EPA guidelines. City officials, aware the unit might be an incinerator, had no formal reason to take any action despite the zoning code violations because the owner had not yet requested an occupancy permit for the new building constructed to contain the incinerator (Board of Zoning Appeals, 1989). Later that year, the unit test-burned 100 tons of waste and was approved by the Chicago regional office of the US Environmental Protection Agency.

In 1987, Alchem-Tron submitted its permit renewal application to the Ohio Hazardous Waste Facility Board (OHWFB). Upon notification that the inclusion of new technology and other changes in its processing capacity warranted a modification to the operating permit, Alchem-Tron had to submit a new permit application. Soon thereafter the USEPA issued a hazardous waste permit, contingent on final State approval, even while the OEPA had referred the company to the State Attorney General to press charges for additional violations.

GSX Chemical Services of Ohio

Alchem-Tron became weaker with each new regulatory challenge. It gradually lost clients and revenue during mandated shut-downs while trying to pay for investment in new technology that could not be used. In February 1988, the owner sold Alchem-Tron, for an estimated $15 to $25 million, to Canadian-based Laidlaw, Inc., which was then the second largest hazardous waste processing company in North America. The property, renamed GSX Chemical Services of Ohio Inc., came under the responsibility of Laidlaw’s American subsidiary headquartered in South Carolina -- GSX Chemical Services, Inc. -- which operated several hazardous waste treatment plants in the US. Laidlaw considered its investment good because it allowed quick expansion of its processing capacity in Ohio and the Midwest, and because the site was already permitted for treatment of hazardous waste including cyanide, which had limited landfill options at the time. Moreover, the new thermal drying beds would increase processing capacity for hazardous solid waste materials.

GSX used a compensatory strategy when bringing a LULU to a new site. It usually established a link to the host community and offered incentives for residents to accept the objectionable waste treatment activities. In Cleveland, however, GSX did not implement its usual strategy, possibly because the facility was already there and lacked a history of confrontation with the neighborhood. So the first community-company contact did not occur until after the required public notification of GSX’s intention to renew its permit.

Aware that the permitting process could be delayed by Alchem-Tron's past pattern of carelessness, the GSX corporation brought in new management to improve lab and waste handling procedures. By November 1988, the operating permit appeared secure following a sparsely attended public hearing. However, in December a neighborhood resident read a public notice about the proposed incinerator and began a chain reaction to these plans.

After obtaining a copy of the permit application from GSX, several residents organized and got the OEPA to postpone a decision on the incinerator until an additional public hearing could be held. Meanwhile, this loosely formed neighborhood organization got more people involved and began to engage in protest activities. They also investigated the history of the facility and of GSX, which had several law suits pending against its facilities in South Carolina, and worked to draw in their city council member, as well as others in the community.

One year after the GSX purchase, opposition to it had expanded to the suburbs. A Shaker Heights resident circulated copies of a local Sierra Club member’s letter to the editor of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, which described how airborne by-products from the GSX incinerator would likely be wind-blown toward the Eastern suburbs. Within days, a group of Shaker Heights residents created Families Interested in a Toxic-free Environment (FITE) to stop the incinerator.

FITE eventually formed a loose coalition with the North Broadway neighborhood organization and worked to bring into the dispute Cleveland’s mayor, who was campaigning to become Ohio’s governor. The Mayor came out against the incinerator after members of FITE and the North Broadway neighborhood presented ample data casting doubt on the safety of the technology and the reputation of GSX. The eloquent presentation of this evidence convinced members of the mayor’s office that opposing the company’s plans was in his best political interest.

In April 1989, the OEPA and OHWFB each held a meeting in Cleveland to hear from the community and GSX before setting a new public hearing date. Hundreds of people came to speak against the incinerator, including several state and local politicians who had previously shown no interest in Alchem-Tron or GSX. A couple of these had even provided letters of support for the proposed thermal drying unit when GSX had applied for permit renewal. GSX management and lawyers took a defensive stance in their response to questions from the audience. At the second meeting with an equally large turnout, a company spokesman stated GSX would only respond to questions submitted in writing after the meeting. Within days of the Cleveland meetings, the OEPA found numerous violations during a surprise site visit and fined GSX $900,000 (later reduced to $90,000).

Around this time the City of Cleveland officially entered the dispute following a citizens' complaint about GSX to the Division of Building and Housing. After a site inspection, the City filed a notice against GSX, citing the company for using new buildings without a certificate of occupancy and operating an incinerator in a district which did not allow this use. A hearing before the Board of Zoning Appeals was scheduled for later in the summer.

Meanwhile, the Regional Planning Commission of Cuyahoga County, responsible for transportation-related emergencies, had been asked to evaluate risks and benefits of expanding the current waste treatment operation. Planning staff prepared a set of alternative actions the Commission could take, ranging from no action to actively seeking closure of the facility. As events unfolded that spring, the Commission decided to pull out of the permit review process and defer to the OEPA and the City of Cleveland, because it anticipated time-consuming and expensive litigation.

In July, 1989, Ohio's Attorney General obtained a restraining order to close GSX after an unlabeled container of hazardous chemical waste burst into flames causing injury to several employees. GSX was charged with improperly storing and inadequately documenting hazardous waste at the facility, much of which had been there since it had been Alchem-Tron.

In August, 1989, the Board of Zoning Appeals upheld the code violations charged by the City. In defense, GSX claimed the thermal drying beds had been included in plans approved by the City in 1984, and that the equipment technically was not an incinerator since it treated the vapor by-product of waste drying to control air pollution, without burning solid hazardous waste. Further, GSX claimed that the City had targeted its facility while other operating incinerators at several Cleveland facilities less efficient than GSX deserved scrutiny. Meanwhile, Cleveland's Division of Building and Housing granted a certificate of occupancy for the building containing the incinerator, and GSX continued to accept hazardous waste for treatment.

Complaints and legal proceedings against GSX continued as the City of Cleveland and the OEPA pursued more accidents and violations. Finally, in July, 1990, the OEPA director revoked GSX's operating permit, ordering the company to stop receiving hazardous waste and to safely shut down within 90 days. GSX, allowed to continue accepting waste pending an appeal, had another accident and was ordered to shut down completely until a court decision could be made.

During this respite, GSX representatives approached the neighborhood, proposing to shut down the cyanide treatment and fuel blending operations, to set up an environmental compliance committee with representatives from the neighborhood and from City and State government, and to delay incinerator operations by two years. The neighborhood group rejected all proposals. Negotiations with the City continued into the fall, and the court ordered GSX to remain closed until the November permit hearing. On October 23, 1990, GSX officials announced Laidlaw’s decision to close the facility permanently. GSX submitted a closure plan, which was approved in 1992. To date, the facility has not yet completely shut down. It continues to operate as an interim holding station for waste to be shipped to other locations for treatment.

The GSX case illustrates the complex decision making process surrounding an attempt to implement unwanted change to an existing unwanted land use. All affected interests were not represented in the decision process. While the space of options was reduced from the outset, the parties' interim choices further narrowed down the options considered at each decision point. As a result, the outcome depended largely on the path created in time by the stakeholders’ choices. Following is an analysis of how each of the parties involved was affected by this path-dependent outcome and its consequences, and of how some key interests remained unrepresented in the conflict.

GSX

GSX headquarters lost a very promising investment. The purchase represented an opportunity to expand company operations into the midwest region of the country and the possibility of capturing a larger share of hazardous waste treatment business from outside Ohio. GSX's ideal outcome would have been to operate at full capacity including the eventual use of the incinerator. Towards the end of the process, the company offered concessions that would have eliminated the much objected-to cyanide treatment and postponed operating the incinerator. However, it was unwilling to operate without incineration capacity, because this option was financially less viable in the long run. This alternative was also temporarily eliminated from consideration when the OEPA decided to revoke the facility’s operating permit. Although the company’s appeal might have restored the permit, it required a commitment of additional funds and time for litigation while the treatment plant remained inoperable.

The decision to pull out of the legal proceedings surprised the community groups who viewed GSX as the stronger opponent. However, the company’s decision was a response to the economic reality of sustaining a protracted fight with local and state regulatory agencies, politicians, and community activists in an already soft market.

The Community

The outcome had a mix of positive and negative effects for the immediate neighborhood of the GSX facility and for the wider Cleveland community. Preventing a hazardous waste incinerator from operating in their midst was considered positive, as was the stoppage of any treatment at the site. The residents of North Broadway gained a marginally cleaner environment since other pollutant-emitting facilities in the area continued to operate. On the negative side, several residents in the neighborhood and others employed at the facility lost between 25 and 50 jobs.

The neighborhood group did not go into this process with the intent to shut down the facility. However, the hostile interactions with the old and new plant management, made the plant closing an attractive prospect over time since it appeared to be the only way to stop GSX from getting its permit to operate the incinerator.

Perhaps in contrast, many members of FITE did not want toxic waste to be treated anywhere in the region so they actively pursued this outcome. Although the group had nothing to gain or lose directly from a complete shutdown, FITE was satisfied with GSX’s decision not to appeal the OEPA decisions, which eliminated any chance to reinstate its permit to treat hazardous waste at the site. FITE was especially gratified with its ability to change the course of events by presenting a strong and informed argument about the potential for environmental harm posed by the facility.

Public Officials

Prior to public involvement in the dispute, government agencies did not appear to pursue actively the public’s protection in its dealings with Alchem-Tron. Neither the intricacy of legal procedures, nor the shortage of agency staff account completely for the willingness of both the City of Cleveland and the OEPA to allow the company to continue operations despite repeated violations of health and safety codes. Yet the City of Cleveland and the OEPA both reacted similarly to the closure of GSX -- quick to claim victory for the community and the people of Ohio, and pleased to put an end to a potentially long litigation process. In comparison, planners who had analyzed the impact of the closure on the county for the Regional Planning Commission considered the outcome to be less than satisfactory because the negative consequences on the regional economy were not taken into consideration by anyone.

Unrepresented Interests

As the dispute unfolded, several parties and their interests went unrepresented by those affecting the direction of the decision process and its outcome. Parties actively involved in the dispute ignored some important immediate and long-term consequences of closing the facility. What impact would a closed hazardous waste facility have on economic development in the neighborhood, the city and the region? How would future efforts to introduce hazardous waste treatment be shaped by the dispute and its outcome? At no time during the dispute did GSX’s opponents seem to have considered the consequences of their actions on the future of the community, the region, or hazardous waste treatment. Similarly, any concern of GSX for the future of the site and waste treatment in Cleveland was limited to its own financial liability.

While some parties involved in the conflict were aware that a complete shutdown of GSX could have long-term effects, neither the needs of GSX customers, nor the future economic development and sustainability needs of region were given any consideration. GSX customers in the Cleveland area lost a cost-effective, convenient means of disposing of their hazardous waste locally. In the long run, their loss is expected to have regional impacts as waste is shipped over greater distances for treatment, increasing the cost and risk of accidents, and the number of people exposed to accidental spills. Similarly, future needs of the region were given only partial consideration in the dispute. The Regional Planning Commission expressed some concerns regarding hazardous waste treatment needs, and community activists and environmental groups raised health and safety issues within the region. However, the opportunity to discuss long-term solutions to waste treatment and viable alternatives to the incinerator was missed by all.

The decision to close the facility was independent of future site reuse. Nonetheless, the consequences of closure should have been afforded the same level of consideration as were the consequences of allowing the facility to remain open and/or to operate the incinerator. Of particular concern is the impact of closing GSX on community redevelopment. The site cannot be used or sold without an environmental evaluation. If it is found contaminated, which is likely given the history of poor handling of hazardous materials, liability and cleanup costs can make it cost-efficient for GSX to leave the site vacant. The site thus joins a growing list of permanently contaminated urban properties referred to as "brownfields." The high cost and risk of bringing such sites up to current environmental standards often blocks redevelopment because neither current owners, nor prospective investors or the city can afford the cleanup.

Unrepresented in the dispute were also the concerns of other business owners wishing to operate hazardous waste treatment facilities in the area (with or without incineration). Although opponents of such operations may not see this as a concern, this remains a legitimate activity as long as such facilities are sanctioned and legal. This effect of the GSX conflict surfaced very soon after the company’s decision to close was announced. The City of Cleveland joined the North Broadway neighborhood in an effort to stop the owner of a medical waste incinerator within a block of GSX from getting an operating permit from the OEPA. The treatment facility appeared to follow Alchem-Tron’s approach by keeping its intentions quiet until the public hearing, which was held a month after the decision to close GSX. The history of violations at this facility combined with community opposition convinced the OEPA and the OHWFB to not grant an operating permit for the medical waste incinerator. However, following several appeals, claiming unfair treatment due to the GSX conflict, the facility was granted a temporary operating permit.

We consider the outcome of this conflict suboptimal: it is less than could have been obtained by at least some of the stakeholders under the circumstances, and it left most stakeholders dissatisfied. This outcome, with uncertain immediate gains for a few accompanied by losses to many in the long run, may be attributed to its path dependence, to the lack of representation of important regional interests, and to a lack of process skills on all sides. Incomplete representation may be an inherent problem in any decision situation that lacks a clear, institutionalized process. Without such a process, or a checklist of steps, any effort to initiate change to an existing unwanted land use may involve a host of entities acting unilaterally with little concern for joint consequences. Under such circumstances, there is little chance for comprehensive coverage of public concerns; the ability to monitor enforcement of existing laws and regulations is impaired; and, even the public entities' obligation to act on behalf of their constituents is unclear.

In the next section, we examine issues that arise when new locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) are proposed. Since LULUs have received rather extensive research attention, similarities and differences might be instructive for the process of changing an existing unwanted land use such as GSX.

Frank Popper (1981) coined the phrase "Locally Unwanted Land Use" -- LULU -- to describe development projects that tend to arouse community opposition, such as hazardous waste disposal facilities or nuclear power plants. At the outset, the "unwanted" label carried the presumption that the objections of host communities stemmed from perceived risks to human health and to the environment. More recently, the LULU reference has expanded to shopping malls, prisons, homeless shelters, halfway houses and group homes (Dear, 1992; Susskind, 1990). These land uses evoke similar hostile reactions from their prospective hosts although their consequences, no longer restricted to health and environmental threats, are by no means equivalent. Tactics once used to block the construction of a hazardous waste treatment facility, such as public protest and law suits, are now employed in "Stop the Mart" efforts to keep large discount chains such as WalMart and Kmart from building at suburban locations.

In general, an activity rates "unwanted" by its prospective host community if expected to have one or more of the following consequences, typically considered undesirable:

• Functional consequences, deriving from the spatial redistribution of activities following the presence of a new land use (e.g., car traffic increases or rerouting, or a change in the level of access to existing land uses);
• Economic consequences, referring mainly to the effect a new land use might have on adjacent property values; may also may include the costs a community incurs during the process of negotiating the change;
• Environmental consequences, including temporary or permanent effects on human health or a reduction in the quality of air, soil, water or wildlife. Reactions to environmental hazards, rooted in risk perceptions, are difficult to predict (e.g., noxious effects of familiar and ubiquitous substances such as gas station fumes are practically ignored, while lesser known evils such as the cyanide fumes from the GSX incinerator can elicit acute apprehension).
• Social consequences expected from the presence of a new facility’s users, who may be different in some ways from their hosts (e.g., the aged, the disabled, or the homeless). As with environmental concerns, reactions to social consequences are not necessarily fully informed. However, misperceptions are due not to the complexity and technicality of issues, as with environmental consequences, but rather to prejudice coupled with lack of direct experience.

It is noteworthy that political and administrative responses to LULU opposition may differ with the nature of claimed consequences. For example, due to the environmental regulations and their salience in political debates, as well as prevalent risk aversion with respect to health and safety issues, public officials tend to view at least some of the public environmental concerns as legitimate (Brock & Cormick, 1989). The legal backing of land use regulations helps arguments against functional consequences of LULUs. In contrast, considerably less legal support can be garnered against claims of economic or social effects, which therefore tend to appear less legitimate.

LULUs challenge planners involved in land use decisions to look beyond the basic questions of compatibility and zoning compliance, and to take into account the concerns of all those affected by the proposed activity, including the host community as well as the LULU owners and users. When citizens expect negative consequences from a new land use, they often may act to prevent the siting in their community. An existing unwanted land use can trigger similar reactions from the community if it proposes a change that is perceived to have negative consequences. Interestingly, many existing land uses, which would meet with local opposition if sited today, frequently operate for years unchallenged by the public until an attempt to change their size and/or function captures community attention and offers a chance for intervention in a situation that is otherwise closed to challenge.

Change is an opportunity for conflict. At times, it offers the host community a chance to express dissatisfaction that exceeds the scope of the proposed change. What insights derive from the GSX case that can guide the planner’s role in improving participant satisfaction with the decision making process when unwanted change is proposed for an existing land use? In search for some answers, we compare features of this case with LULUs along dimensions related to change decisions: community perception of the status quo and of the consequences of the proposed change, the role of laws and regulations, and patterns of community involvement.

Perceived consequences

Community perceptions of the likely effects of an activity should be the same, whether or not an activity already exists at a location. For example, the general risks and benefits should appear much the same for a proposed and an existing incinerator. However, in practice communities might not relate in the same way to consequences of a proposed land use compared to an existing one. Specifically, an existing unwanted land use is likely to be perceived, at least at the outset, as less risky to the host community than a similar new LULU because the community has already been living with the unwanted land use in its midst.

The effect of familiarity on perceptions of risk plays a role in any attempt to mobilize the community into a participatory change process. Whereas the risk of a new LULU can only be based on speculations, community perception of an existing unwanted land use can be derived from observation. For the North Broadway neighborhood, hazardous waste treatment was not objectionable, because it had been a neighborhood fixture for years. In fact, that is what made Alchem-Tron an attractive purchase for GSX, when compared to the prospect of persuading another community to host a new waste treatment facility. However, lack of citizen attention to a land use cannot be assumed to indicate perceptions of low risk; rather it may only reflect a limited awareness of the activity, as was the case with GSX.

Of course, the level of community indifference to the consequences of an existing unwanted land use prior to a proposed change is expected to vary with each case, making it difficult to anticipate reaction based on the type of land use or type of change proposed. However, community reaction to change is likely to intensify if the change will result in a completely new activity at the site, especially if the new function is considered even less desirable than the existing use (e.g., converting a vacant motel into a low-security detention center). Although the handling of waste at the facility had threatened public health for many years, neighborhood concern did not surface until GSX attempted to operate an incinerator at the site. In such cases the community may react as it would to siting a new LULU.

For the change proponent, the security of being already established at a site can lead to the temptation, costly at times, to overlook community concerns, as GSX did in deciding not to use its usual protocol for a new siting. For the host community, delayed reactions allow the project to proceed to a point where the change process is harder to join or oppose. As for planners intervening in an unwanted land use change conflict, they are apt to face a string of crises requiring quick action, instead of an opportunity to plan and implement meaningful community participation in the negotiations.

The Status Quo

If negotiations around a LULU siting fail, the outcome is the status quo, leaving the community relatively unchanged, at least physically. A failed attempt to implement unwanted change to an existing land may upset the status quo if the issues that prompted the change initiative -- financial difficulties, technological change or increased competition -- prevent continuation of operations under status quo conditions. GSX could have continued treating hazardous waste without an incinerator. However, the owners deemed the incineration capability necessary for economic reasons and did not consider operating the facility as before to be a viable option. GSX’s decision to close the facility after failing to change created a brownfield that cannot be re-used unless decontaminated, which may be too costly or even infeasible at this point in time.

A proposed change to an existing land use can also act as a catalyst for communities to question the status quo. While community tolerance for an existing activity may exceed that for a new LULU, a change initiative may reduce this tolerance to the point where eliminating the existing land use altogether becomes a desirable outcome. Prior to the public hearing about the incinerator, the broader issue of hazardous waste treatment was not an active concern of either the neighborhood or suburban group. The proposed change led some community members to learn about hazardous waste treatment and to deem it "unwanted". The public input required by the permitting process triggered a reaction that went beyond the incinerator to question the status quo which allowed hazardous waste treatment in a residential neighborhood. At that point, even if GSX had wanted to continue operating without the incinerator, residents might no longer have accepted it in the neighborhood because they came to distrust GSX’s ability to operate any facility safely.

The status quo changed in yet another way in the GSX case. Increased awareness and activism empowered neighborhood residents and gave them skills that could be applied in other cases of unwanted land use change. From their dealings with GSX, North Broadway residents learned to scrutinize local projects and to enlist support from elected officials. They also experienced a limited degree of success in their effort, which can embolden a group to take action. This was evidenced when a medical waste treatment facility down the street from GSX attempted to get its permit to operate an incinerator. Residents saw this as an opportunity to exercise new power and skills, employing similar tactics to block the permit (at least temporarily).

The inability of an existing LULU to return to the status quo after a change initiative, and the opportunity for the community to question issues beyond the proposed change need to be factored into any process designed to assist with the decision to implement unwanted change. Neither LULU siting experiences nor LULU prescriptions offer much insight into these areas of concern.

Laws and Regulations

The use of land within a jurisdiction is typically regulated through zoning codes which guide new development and help monitor existing uses to ensure compliance with the law. Additional regulations imposed on unwanted land uses can affect siting, such as the requirement to obtain an operating license or permit from a state or federal agency, suggesting that a new LULU is more likely to be scrutinized before than after it is sited.

The different role regulations play for an unwanted land use once it is sited stands out in the GSX case. At a minimum, the law provides for some type of police power to maintain compliance with zoning. In reality, this basic monitoring is quite limited by staff and financial constraints. Most jurisdictions cannot afford to actively seek out violations, and instead rely on the public to report them. From our discussions with public officials about the GSX case, it became evident that with respect to regulatory oversight, the unwanted status did not necessarily warrant differential treatment. The GSX facility was assumed in compliance until contrary evidence surfaced either through routine inspection or citizen complaints.

Where a land use is subject to several regulatory authorities with mandate to monitor compliance, no mechanism ensures their interaction or coherence of decisions. This was evident in the frequent lack of communication among key regulatory agencies involved in the GSX case. For example, the Ohio EPA was not expected to inform the City of Cleveland about the presence of the incinerator at the site, although this constituted a violation of local zoning code, or to report findings of safety violations to local officials. Even City departments took conflicting actions. The City’s Division of Building and Housing issued an occupancy permit for the building containing the incinerator, although the Board of Zoning Appeals had found GSX in violation of the zoning code.

These occurrences are not uncommon at a site subject to several layers of governmental regulation. The lack of coordination among regulatory agencies gives code enforcement the appearance of arbitrariness and political manipulability, which does not serve any stakeholder or the public interest in the long run, though in the short run some stakeholders can use the disarray to their advantage. A process to implement unwanted change in an existing land use that offers some measure of coordination among various government levels might increase the community's trust in public agencies, enabling conflict management.

Community Involvement

Siting a LULU usually involves some form of citizen participation, such as public hearings and informational meetings. The siting literature recommends an active role in decision making for the host community, and early interaction of all the affected parties (Susskind 1990, Stamato 1990, Weisberg 1993). Changing an existing land use, whether wanted by the host community or not, does not always require public participation or even formal notice of intent.

The installation of the GSX incinerator did require a public hearing. However, this process was not really participatory, and community input was reactive at best since it came late in the decision process when several options had already been eliminated. From the company's perspective, community members were not parties to the decision making. The neighborhood group became involved in the GSX plans almost by accident. In fact, a Sierra Club member from outside the neighborhood was the only opponent at the initial public hearing. This was the person who had written the letter to the Plain Dealer which spurred the formation of the suburban group, FITE.

Even if a community becomes involved in the change process, there is still no built-in mechanism to ensure the community's planning agency will intervene. There was no obvious point for planner intervention in the GSX case until it was found that the incinerator was in violation of the zoning code. Obviously, had Alchem-Tron sought a zoning variance for the addition of the incinerator, the City's Department of Planning would have been required to act, but instead, the incinerator became a matter for the Department of Law. Although the County Planning Commission was an early participant, its mandate did not require planning staff to engage the community.

In hindsight, if the initial agreement between Alchem-Tron and the City to handle air pollution violations had included planners, the "state-of-the art technology" proposed in the 1983 consent agreement with the City of Cleveland might have been scrutinized with regard to its compliance with zoning. The lack of planner participation is of concern because it puts a heavy burden on other officials and community members to educate themselves about issues and legal aspects of proposed land use changes. As with siting a new LULU, citizens are further burdened trying to locate the resources -- funding, political support, information -- necessary to become effective at protecting their interests. Planner intervention would appear to be a more efficient and equitable approach to helping the change process when it is initiated. Moreover, it may be the only way to ensure that regional and long-range interests are factored into the decision making process surrounding change of an existing unwanted land use.

While siting new unwanted land uses is amply featured in the current planning and negotiation literature, implementing change in an existing unwanted land use remains a relatively unexplored issue. In the GSX case no process for changing existing locally unwanted land uses was preset or coordinated by any single public agency at one government level. Furthermore, there is no prescription for a planner's role, and no procedural guidelines, as in the case of siting new unwanted land uses. Planner intervention might become a device for reducing the likelihood of a suboptimal outcome when change is proposed for an existing unwanted land use. Such intervention would entail planner focus on a sound process rather than on achieving a particular outcome; ensuring genuine and broad participation in decisions; adequate exchange of information; and, an attempt to identify interests not at the table. We examine next what role planners might play in a process that facilitates public consideration of proposed unwanted change to an existing land use. After reviewing siting principles recommended for new LULUs, we explore which components, if any, are transferable to change in existing land uses such as GSX.

When the LULUs concept was introduced, attention focused on ways to reduce siting delays caused by community opposition. Planners' usual tool kit, including zoning, long range forecasts, permit reviews and environmental impact statements, offered limited opportunity to resolve the conflict of interests (Popper, 1981, Dorius, 1993). Process-oriented devices such as conflict resolution and negotiation techniques, as well as interest-oriented economic compensation and distribution incentives offered more productive responses to LULU siting opposition. Over the years, planners assisting LULU siting efforts have increasingly adopted these devices. Despite constraints that limit transferability from new to existing LULUs, conflict resolution and negotiation principles and strategies offer promise and partial guidance as tools for planners intervening in the process of changing an existing unwanted land use.

Distribution and Compensation

Economic compensation can make up for lost property value, as with payment for depreciation on homes near airports. It can even render the unwanted land use desirable to the host community. For example, competitive bidding schemes let localities with qualified sites take LULUs for adequate payment (Inhaber, 1992), where LULU impacts can be quantified (Popper, 1992) and related fairly to compensation levels. Such schemes raise the concern that localities with poor economic conditions might take unwanted land uses, disregarding other community interests such as health and safety. Similar concerns may arise if incentives were offered to residents for accepting change to an existing unwanted land use. However, offering fair compensation does not appear generally successful (Rabe, 1994), possibly because it does not attend to other community interests that block change. Therefore, for existing land uses initiating change, compensation may be considered in conjunction with other negotiated measures.

An equitable LULU distribution process may obviate the need for financial incentives or compensation, as with New York City's "Fair Share" plan to apportion hard-to-site public facilities throughout the city (Weisberg, 1993). While the process gives planners more control, it has met with limited success because it does not deal fully with political obstacles (Rose, 1993), so it remains vulnerable to NIMBY reactions. This process has limited application to change in existing land uses, since neither the consequences nor the time when change will be proposed are predictable, and relocation is usually not considered, at least initially. While the existing land use may end up relocating, that is usually the result of failure to identify a satisfactory arrangement at the current site.

Legal Approaches and Regulations

The law at times offers some assistance when change proposed for an existing LULU meets with community opposition. For example, residents anticipating negative social and economic consequences from human service facilities such as homeless shelters, half-way houses or group homes for persons with disabilities often try to block the siting of these facilities in their neighborhood. However, clients and operators of these facilities have legal standing under Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, to sue for damages (Dear, 1992). Opponents of LULU and of change in existing land uses also have legal recourse, especially in cases that require zoning variance or operating permits.

In these situations the "unwanted" label is usually linked to a communal "not in my backyard" response considered selfish when it prevents the delivery of needed social services. While the law helps expedite the siting process, its use can limit the opportunity for community dialogue regarding the necessity of the proposed LULU or possible alternatives to it. As with compensation, strategies rooted in legal remedies tend to focus on achieving a particular outcome, neglecting a sound decision process. They also tend to ignore the interests of parties not at the table.

Negotiation and Conflict Resolution

Framing LULU siting as a negotiation problem attempts to give planners a role in the decision process and to make it participatory and transparent. The Facility Siting Credo (Susskind, 1990) provides an example of how LULU siting can be managed as a negotiation among all those likely to be affected by the proposed unwanted land use. The Credo aims to include all stakeholders and to identify latent concerns that might otherwise go unattended and later stall the process. Trust building, seeking agreement that the status quo is unacceptable, consensual decision modes and the design of fair compensation mechanisms are some recommended ways to garner the host community’s approval for siting an unwanted facility. Stamato (1990) further recommends using either a bi-partisan approach as Congress does when deciding on military base closings, or third party intervention to prevent political backlash for local officials. However, negotiating LULU siting or change does not of itself ensure a sound participatory process. In his analysis of hazardous waste facilities siting, Heiman (1990) observes that planners may actually reduce opportunities to discuss alternatives to the proposed LULU if efforts to engage the public are only used instrumentally to counter an expected NIMBY response.

Examining these principles, some currently in use, yields some suggestions likely to apply to existing LULU change. Kunreuther, Aarts and Fitzgerald (1992) found among 29 siting cases nationwide that success could be attributed to the ability to deal with the participants' differences in values and goals, with the general community mistrust of siting efforts, and with the propensity to maintain the status quo. Unsuccessful cases, where the facility was not sited or was strongly opposed by the community before it was sited, had either failed to gain community consensus on the unacceptability of the status quo, or failed to foster the degree of trust in the process necessary for adequate public participation. These findings suggest that part of the challenge of devising a sound siting or change decision process resides in the difficulty of defining success. Handling the siting of an unwanted land use as a negotiation may increase the likelihood that a LULU is sited in a community. However, from a planner’s vantage, success might mean to a large extent that the decision process is transparent and accessible to all parties likely to be affected by the outcome, although planners are by no means, and should not be, indifferent among outcomes.

Land use decisions have been traditionally a planner's domain. However, the usual planning devices such as zoning, impact assessments and forecasting tend to be politically passive or reactive to events. A salient theme of the LULU siting literature is the benefit of strengthening the planner's role, to render a politicized and at times haphazard decision process transparent to the community, improving the likelihood that most, if not all parties will be satisfied with the outcome (Stamato, 1990; Susskind, 1990; Weisberg, 1993).

As a first step, planners could provide their constituents technical assistance in evaluating pros and cons of a proposed change in existing unwanted land uses, as they already do in other situations. Such assistance could include assessing and interpreting risks, especially those related to complex technologies (Klapp, 1992; Ozawa, 1991) that are likely to be alien to lay stakeholders. In this role planners would act much like data mediators (Sebenius, 1986) helping identify sources for data and for models of impact that are acceptable and trustworthy for all parties. Although definitive models may never be produced, information can reduce some of the uncertainties faced by the parties. Planners can help locate and present the available information, conveying the level of confidence it deserves.

Planners may be in a position to provide more than such technical assistance. Beyond their technical skills, planners also have the space for interpreting their mandate to accomplish a broad set of objectives and to shape the decision making process itself. This entails at the very least assessing the problem at hand, identifying the affected parties, and then enabling them to participate in the dialogue and negotiation. In this respect, Krumholz’s (1982) suggestion in the context of equity planning applies aptly to planner intervention in existing LULU change: "... planners themselves must seize the initiative and define their own roles relative to the real needs of the city and its people. This course of action involves some political risks but ... the risks are manageable."

Planners assuming a central role in any dispute have been likened to mediators (see, for example, Susskind & Ozawa, 1984, and Forester, 1987). There is a limit to this analogy in land use change decisions. Unlike mediators in other contexts, or even planners employed by private entities, planners in the public domain have a mandate to protect a specific interest (public, however defined). Furthermore, planners working in public agencies have the ability to affect the siting process in ways that go well beyond the typical information transfer role mediators perform (Kaufman & Duncan, 1988). As a negotiator, the planner is well positioned to shape the decision making process, so as to reduce the path-dependence of the outcome. However, planners operating in the public domain are responsible to their public agency employer, and therefore cannot be expected to, and in fact should not, remain neutral. Therefore planners could intervene in a siting conflict proactively as negotiators: not neutrally (as mediators would) and not in a reactive mode (rooted in law and current practice). Of course, this requires planners to be comfortable with such a role and equipped with the necessary skills to make negotiation effective. Rabinowitz (1988) finds that not every planner is comfortable with the negotiator role, and that not every situation in which planners are involved requires it.

How should planners intervene in changing existing LULUs? Answers depend to some extent on the particulars of each case. In general, a process for changing a facility, both in terms of assessing its impacts and involving the community in decision making, needs to be institutionalized, known and clear to all parties. As siting LULUs has become more costly and time consuming, especially with the drawn-out legal procedures used to settle disputes, attention has shifted to developing strategies that can enhance the efficiency of the process in the sense of minimizing expenditures and maximizing the return on resources spent to reach agreement. The same challenges confront existing LULUs trying to initiate change. Here too, planners could assist by making the change process more efficient -- reducing the level of costs per decision -- and more equitable.

Equity in this context is intricately related to the reconciliation of different legitimate interests and the distribution of benefits and costs among stakeholders. Krumholz and Forester (1991) have already argued for planner involvement in ensuring equity of outcome and process. Sheppard, Lewicki and Minton (1992) go beyond outcome and process in their discussion of equity to consider the fairness of the system producing them. In LULU change, this system can be construed to include regulatory and planning agencies. In the GSX case these agencies reacted to events driven by other parties, which reduced their input considerably. An institutionalized process of planner intervention could go some way toward fostering process and outcome equity through the equity of a preset system. Such an intervention system may be less susceptible to the political pressures of the moment, which in turn can benefit all parties affected by the change, especially in terms of resources expended in gathering information or securing a place at the negotiation table.

Designing a system for changing existing unwanted land uses in which planners are active negotiators on the public's behalf has its problems, however. First, unlike siting new land uses, proposing to change an existing land use does not readily provide an obvious point for initiating planner involvement. Identifying when planners could and should be involved is difficult because it is likely to differ from case to case, and may only become apparent after the fact. Second, while a proposed LULU is an outsider seeking acceptance in the community, the existing unwanted land use and the host community are both to be served by the planner. Therefore the nature of the intervention needs careful definition.

Planners can carry out intervention in change disputes at several levels, ranging from a purely facilitative mode predicated on enabling communication, to support of legislation development, to activism on behalf of specific groups. At all levels, planners must attend to dual concerns for process and substance of land use disputes. Our focus on the existing land use change process, rather than on substantive issues, has led to a list of process-centered recommendations. While they received less attention here, substantive aspects of change such as public intervention in private sector events are already the focus of much debate that can certainly inform specific cases of existing land use change and the role planners might play in them. Based on our analysis of the GSX case and the LULU literature, we propose below some desirable process features of planner intervention.

A planner might routinely:

• diagnose candidates for protracted community conflict: devise and update periodically profiles of land use change situations that can benefit from planner intervention, and track cases (including obsolete LULUs and brownfields) in the region of their responsibility;
• build a core of helping hands: identify individuals and groups that could be called upon to assist in land use change decisions, based on prior interactions with a community;
• map responsibilities: identify the regulatory agencies that oversee the LULUs present in a community;
• script procedures: devise protocols of public involvement.

• be a step ahead: anticipate possible community reactions even if the existing LULU appears accepted in the community at the outset;
• do reality checks: help the existing LULU initiating change to view acceptance in the community as a privilege to be earned, even if it appears to be currently unchallenged;
• level the information field: ensure that all parties involved/affected are informed about applicable laws and regulations;
• provide technical advice: assess the full range of risks associated with the change and the no-change alternatives;
• offer a "plan B": identify reasonable alternatives to change for the existing LULU if change proves unacceptable to the community;
• open the process: make the decision process participatory to the extent possible; for example, do not wait until public hearings are formally convened to tap public opinion.

To successfully institutionalize planner intervention it is necessary to foster a measure of cooperation between agencies at several government levels. The latter is difficult, but not impossible in the current climate of heightened awareness of environmentally-related urban problems such as brownfields and urban sprawl, and concerns with environmental equity. To wit, several communities (e.g., Cleveland, Ohio, 1995; Seattle, Washington, 1991; and the states of California, 1994, and Louisiana, 1991) have set their own environmental priorities through public participatory processes and have begun to require agencies at various government levels to cooperate in implementing recommendations (Kaufman & Snape, 1995). However, these examples are still exceptions rather than the norm.

The GSX case exemplifies an existing land use attempting change in the face of community opposition. As with all case studies, this one is special in many ways, and therefore does not claim generality in either process or outcome. The attempt to effect a significant change in the function of the GSX facility offered a basis for comparison of the decision process with the seemingly germane process of siting LULUs. A key finding is that while LULU siting can follow a procedure partly dictated by such land use tools as zoning and permits, no preset sequence exists for changing an existing unwanted land use. The existing LULU’s foothold in the community sets it apart from LULUs in other ways meaningful to planning. For example, it may lead politicians and regulatory agencies to treat an existing LULU as a constituent, perhaps more leniently than they would a new LULU. In general, it seems that:

1. the existing unwanted land use change process is likely to benefit from some form of planner assistance, including the convening of stakeholders, the collection and presentation of technical and legal information to the lay public, and the representation of interests absent from the process;
2. the existing unwanted land use is among the planner's constituents, suggesting the planner intervention focus should be on ensuring sound process (i.e., genuine participation, representation, adequate access and exchange of information, protection and expansion of the solution space), rather than pursuit of a particular outcome;
3. when the effects of changing an existing land use transcend the boundaries of the host community, the affected city or region may not be a direct party to the negotiations but is often part of the planner's constituency. Other typically unrepresented interests (such as future generations) are equally among a planner’s constituents. Institutionalizing planner intervention in change of existing land uses may increase the likelihood that such interests receive their due consideration;
4. given the tendency of change conflicts to escalate in scope beyond the change itself, planner intervention might assist in structuring an expanded debate to include related community concerns from the outset, thereby preventing early polarization or late unraveling of the decision process;
5. unless planner intervention is institutionalized, it will only happen on an ad-hoc basis; some expected benefits of institutionalizing planner intervention include: a reduction in the time spent to formulate strategies; fairness in access to the process and to information and advice (with an appearance of fairness lacking in ad-hoc processes); fewer decision costs to parties; and, reduced path dependence of outcomes as a result of planners’ active protection of the alternatives space.

Are LULU siting principles and processes fully transferable to change in existing unwanted land uses? The GSX case suggests that while the two situations resemble each other in many ways, there are some key differences that warrant the recommendation of guidelines specific to planner intervention in existing LULU change. LULU prescriptions that may transfer include the need to involve all stakeholders in the decision process, and consideration of compensation schemes. In principle, these guidelines, along with the requirement that planners be involved with a mandate that is adequately reflective of their position as a proxy negotiator for specific interests should be part of any change protocol. Differences requiring specific design for existing LULU change include the community attitude towards familiar risks, the absence of the status quo from the outcome space, and the potential for escalation of conflict beyond the scope of the proposed change.

Case-based studies and their comparison are useful in identifying issues that need research attention (Rabe, 1994). However, establishing the degree of generality and the usefulness of case findings to planner practice requires further exploration to validate these issues and evaluate the effect of prescriptions such as the institutionalization of planner intervention in existing LULU change or the negotiator role of planners. The benefits and costs to stakeholders of planner intervention in a broad set of cases also need evaluation. A related topic that requires research attention is a set of criteria for evaluating the quality of processes and outcomes of change initiatives, with or without planner intervention.